$71 billion for the U.S. Space Force is now part of a wider debate over how America should prepare for conflict in orbit. Researchers at the Mitchell Institute have warned that the United States still lacks a shared framework for deciding when hostile behavior in space becomes the opening phase of armed conflict.
The finding comes from Space Superiority Through the Spectrum of Conflict, a Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies report based on a two-day unclassified workshop held in January 2026. More than 50 experts from the military, government, industry, allied forces and academia examined how conflict in space might begin, spread and be managed.
The report’s central concern is simple and unsettling. Satellites can be jammed, shadowed, dazzled, hacked, or threatened in ways that create real military effects while leaving political leaders unsure how to respond. In that uncertainty, adversaries can push boundaries one action at a time.
According to the Mitchell Institute, “The United States is already operating in a sustained gray zone in space, particularly with China.” That gray zone now sits at the center of national security planning as the Pentagon seeks to more than double the Space Force’s budget from roughly $31 billion to about $71 billion.
The Gray Zone in Orbit
The gray zone in space describes activity that falls between routine competition and open warfare. It can include jamming a navigation signal, interfering with a satellite link, maneuvering close to another spacecraft, or probing a system through cyber means.
These actions can be difficult to classify in real time. A satellite that moves near another satellite may be inspecting it, intimidating its operator, or rehearsing a future attack. A disrupted communications link may reflect hostile interference, a technical fault, or natural space weather.
The Mitchell Institute report argues that this uncertainty slows decisions and limits response options. Its official summary states, “This ambiguity favors competitors by slowing decision-making.” In a crisis, delay can be useful to the side creating the disruption.
Space also has a strange geography. There are no borders in orbit that resemble land or sea boundaries. A satellite passing over a region may serve military, commercial and civilian users at the same time. That makes a single act of interference much harder to frame as a local incident.
The result is a domain where small hostile moves can accumulate. Each unanswered incident can set a new baseline for acceptable behavior, especially when the action stays below a threshold that would trigger a military response.
Why Hostile Acts Are Hard To Define
Defining a hostile act in orbit requires more than spotting unusual behavior. Decision-makers also need to understand intent, effect, attribution and escalation risk. Those four questions rarely arrive with clean answers.
Attribution is one of the hardest problems. A jammer may be hidden, mobile, or operating through several layers of deniability. A cyber intrusion may route through systems in several countries. A satellite maneuver may have a plausible technical explanation.
Intent adds another layer. A close approach in geostationary orbit could be a surveillance operation. It could also be a pressure tactic. In a more dangerous case, it could place a co-orbital system near enough to disable or damage another spacecraft during a crisis.
The Mitchell Institute’s workshop was designed to stress these problems through near-term scenarios. Participants examined how hostile actions might appear across different commands and geopolitical settings. They also considered how the type of weapon, the affected capability and the timing of an incident could change the U.S. response.
That exercise exposed a policy gap. The United States has military doctrine for space operations, but the report says decision frameworks and shared definitions remain underdeveloped. A larger force with better equipment still needs clear guidance for judging when an orbital incident demands a response.
China’s Counterspace Playbook
China is central to the report’s warning because its counterspace activity has developed over decades. The Mitchell Institute authors describe China as a competitor that has normalized coercive behavior in space while keeping many actions below clear thresholds of armed conflict.
Counterspace capabilities can include several kinds of systems. Some interfere with signals. Others target networks. Directed-energy systems can disrupt sensors. Co-orbital systems can maneuver near satellites. Direct-ascent weapons can threaten satellites from the ground.
For the United States, the strategic problem is cumulative pressure. If an adversary repeatedly conducts jamming, cyber operations, or close-proximity maneuvers without a clear cost, those actions may become part of the regular operating environment.
That matters because U.S. forces rely heavily on space. Satellites support missile warning, secure communications, navigation, reconnaissance, weather monitoring, targeting and command and control. A campaign against those systems could weaken military operations on Earth before the first conventional strike.
The report frames space superiority as a condition that must be actively protected. In this view, deterrence requires more than resilient satellites. It also requires visible credibility, rehearsed choices and a willingness to impose costs when hostile behavior crosses agreed lines.
A Space Force Budget Surge
The budget debate gives the report a sharper edge. In April 2026, the Pentagon asked Congress to raise the U.S. Space Force budget from roughly $31 billion to about $71 billion. For the military’s newest and smallest service, that would be a major jump.
U.S. Space Force leaders have spent the service’s early years operating essential satellite systems and building a military culture around space as an active warfighting domain. The Mitchell Institute report suggests that the next phase depends on clearer concepts for deterrence, escalation control and response.
Money can buy capacity. It can support more resilient constellations, better sensors, faster launch options, improved command systems and more robust defensive tools. Those investments can make it harder for an adversary to gain advantage from a single attack.
Still, capability and policy have to move together. A bigger Space Force will still face hard questions if a satellite is shadowed, if GPS is jammed in a crisis region, or if a cyberattack disrupts a military space system without a public claim of responsibility.
The Mitchell Institute’s recommendations emphasize sustained funding, broader military response options, clearer rules of engagement, allied integration, commercial coordination and more realistic training. Those recommendations reflect a service shifting from operating spacecraft toward fighting through contested conditions.
Scenarios That Test Deterrence
The workshop used hypothetical scenarios to probe how the United States might respond to escalating space threats. These included a Chinese anti-satellite attack, Russian interference with satellite navigation, an Iranian attack enabled by space capabilities and an unattributed nuclear detonation in low Earth orbit.
The nuclear scenario is especially severe. A detonation in low Earth orbit could create electromagnetic and radiation effects that damage satellites across many operators. Allied, neutral, commercial and adversary systems could all be affected.
The attribution problem would be immediate. If no state claimed responsibility, leaders would need to decide how much evidence was enough for action. They would also need to weigh whether a response in space, cyberspace, the air, at sea, or on land would reduce escalation or intensify it.
Other scenarios test narrower seams. Jamming satellite navigation may look limited, yet it can affect aircraft, ships, missiles, ground units and civilian infrastructure. A cyber operation against a satellite control system may create uncertainty about whether the spacecraft itself is compromised.
Space deterrence depends on the adversary believing that hostile acts can be detected, attributed and answered. The workshop’s difficulty in reaching shared answers shows why the Mitchell Institute sees decision frameworks as urgent.
What Clearer Rules Would Change
Clearer rules would help leaders act faster during a crisis. They would also help military planners build response options before an emergency begins. The report points to shared definitions, clear thresholds, communication mechanisms and rehearsed decision paths as key needs.
A useful framework would separate different kinds of effects. Temporary jamming, cyber intrusion, sensor interference, close-proximity maneuvering, physical damage and permanent satellite loss all create different risks. Each category may call for a different response.
Rules of engagement would also need political support. Space operations often involve assets that serve military and civilian users at the same time. A response to an attack on a satellite could carry diplomatic, economic and military consequences far beyond orbit.
Messaging is another piece of deterrence. If the United States quietly absorbs each incident, an adversary may conclude that the costs are low. If Washington communicates thresholds clearly, it can reduce uncertainty for allies and competitors alike.
The report does support reducing harmful ambiguity. That means building a vocabulary that officials, commanders, allies and commercial operators can use before a crisis. It also means training people to apply that vocabulary under pressure.
Allies, Industry and Escalation
Modern space operations involve a crowded mix of military, civil and commercial systems. Commercial satellites now provide communications, imagery, data relay and other services that can become relevant during conflict. That creates strength through diversity and it also creates new escalation questions.
The Mitchell Institute event summary states, “Space has become an indispensable element of modern military, economic and societal functions.” That dependence means a hostile act in orbit can ripple through banking, transport, emergency response, weather forecasting and everyday navigation.
Allied cooperation is central because many space missions are shared. The United States relies on partners for sensors, ground stations, launch support, data and political legitimacy. A response framework that works only inside Washington would have limited value during a coalition crisis.
Industry has a similar role. Commercial operators may see anomalies before governments do. They may also own systems that adversaries target because those systems support military operations. Clear reporting channels and preplanned coordination can reduce confusion when minutes matter.
The Mitchell Institute’s warning lands at a moment when the Space Force is seeking a much larger budget and the United States is still shaping its space warfighting doctrine. The hardware race is visible. The harder work is deciding how to recognize, communicate and answer hostile behavior before orbit becomes the first front of a wider conflict.
